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Resumen 
Se discuten posibles epistemologías alternativas de la 
documentación, partiendo de la concepción otletiana, 
pasando por la reformulación de Suzanne Briet, hasta 
llegar al neo-documentalismo de Michael Buckland. En 
lo que respecta al plano teórico, se pone en diálogo el 
juego del lenguaje de Wittgenstein y la perspectiva de 
la documentación de Buckland. El principal objetivo es 
discutir las cuestiones de sentido y significado, apro-
piándose de los conceptos de presencia y ausencia in-
dicativa. Se toman como objetos documentales de re-
ferencia algunas fotografías del difunto profesor 
Eduardo Murguía. Se llega a la conclusión de que el 
documento puede ser caracterizado no sólo como evi-
dencia o prueba, sino como un índice, que puede re-
velar tanto lo que está presente como lo que está au-
sente en el registro documental. 
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Abstract 
Three alternative epistemologies of documentation are 
discussed, starting from the Otletian conception, fol-
lowing with Suzanne Briet´s reframing, and finishing 
with the neo-documentalism of Michael Buckland. Re-
garding the theoretical plane, Wittgenstein’s language 
games and Buckland’s perspective on documentation 
are brought one in front of the other. The main objec-
tive is to discuss the problems of significance and 
meaning, drawing on the concepts of indexical pres-
ence and absence. Some photographs of the late Pro-
fessor Eduardo Murguia are taken as an example and 
reference. The author comes to the conclusion that 
documents can be characterized not necessarily as ev-
idence or proof, but as an index, which can reveal both 
what is present and what is absent in the documentary 
record. 
Keywords: Murguía Marañón, Eduardo Ismael. Briet, 
Suzanne. Buckland, Michael. Documents. Documenta-
tion. Presence. Absence. Legacy. Meaning. Sense. 
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It is common in modernity to define and discuss 
documents as being evidence in support of proof or 
facts. English language dictionary definitions com-
monly state this. It is stated in the beginning of Su-
zanne Briet’s 1951 Qu’est-ce que la documenta-
tion? (Briet, 1951, 2006) through an appeal to the 
definition of “document” in Littré’s dictionary. In 
Paul Otlet’s work it is an assumption that underlies 
his entire project of documentation, in so far as his 
is a social project founded upon an epistemological 
presupposition, namely, naïve empiricism turned 
into a type of logical positivism, so that the world is 
known through the (bibliographical and documen-
tary) logical organization of representations. In Mi-
chael Buckland’s well known article, What is a Doc-
ument? (Buckland, 1997), commenting on Su-
zanne Briet’s work, this notion of document as evi-
dence takes on renewed importance in terms of the 
work of information systems, namely to produce 
the evidence used in arguments (in the sense of 
bibliographies) and also to produce materials that 
may be used as evidence for arguments. 
But what about documents that are not evidence 
of “facts” about the world (what Ludwig Wittgen-
stein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in a 
similar manner called “all that is the case”), but 
rather, which express what is not, rather than 
what is? The reference to Wittgenstein’s early 
work is not fortuitous, for Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
is founded on the same two general epistemolog-
ical premises that Otlet’s notion of documents is 
founded on, except at the level of a propositional 
assertion, rather than documentary evidence, 
namely, a theory of reference as naming, and 
what often goes along with this in positivism, a 
correspondence theory of truth between state-
ment and things. Such a position relegates all that 
is not the case to the realm of the “unsaid” (Witt-
genstein, 1922), which in the Tractatus is the 
realm of non-truth conditions.   
This realm of the unsaid is meaningless for ful-
filling truth conditions, though it may be meaning-
ful in other ways, namely as mystical experiences 
or even sensible performances that are part of the 
domain of representations for states of affairs in 
the empirical world. But these cannot be said be-
cause saying means, in this context, making truth 
conditional assertions. That there could be mean-
ingful signs outside of these truth conditions, 
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however, is the perspective that shaped Wittgen-
stein’s later Philosophical Investigations, where 
statements that make truth assertions are just 
one of many sensible expressions or “games” of 
language. 
In Philosophical Investigations the meaning of a 
term is not sought in a definition, but in a descrip-
tion of its use. Or to put this in the language of 
both philosophy (e.g., Frege’s distinction be-
tween Bedeutung and Sinn) as well as documen-
tary studies, the meaning or ‘reference’ of a term 
is sought by looking at its sense. Sense in Witt-
genstein’s ‘Blue’ and ‘Brown’ Books (composed 
from 1933-1935) is indicated by “grammar”— a 
term which needs to be understood both in a spe-
cifically linguistic and a non-linguistic, social, 
sense. In the Philosophical Investigations the no-
tion of “grammar” is expanded to and replaced by 
“language games,” which refers not only to lin-
guistic grammar, but to the social uses of cultural 
forms that give language both sense and mean-
ing (including reference).  
Michael Buckland’s article, Information as thing 
(Buckland, 1991) is the only Library and Infor-
mation Science article that I know of that men-
tions mystical experiences as being possible “in-
formation.” Buckland notes in parentheses:  
(Note we are restricting our attention to physical 
things and physical events. Some people would say 
that some of their knowledge comes from paraphys-
ical sources, notably from divine inspiration. Others 
would deny any such non-physical source of infor-
mation, but, to the extent that it may exist, infor-
mation science would have to be incomplete if it 
were excluded. Not knowing what to say on the sub-
ject we merely note it as a possible area of unusual 
interest within information science). 
In noting such, Buckland opens the door to not 
just information being a thing, but in a work a few 
years later when he engages Briet’s works (Buck-
land, 1997), he discusses things (or a being, an 
antelope) as being information, and more re-
cently he more fully has discussed the problem of 
sense as context (Buckland, 2015).  
I also note here Buckland’s use of the word “may” 
in the quote above. This word acts as a condi-
tional, indicating what could or can be the case. 
In this context, what could or can be the case is 
sensible, and so, meaningful. The term ‘infor-
mation’ does not only refer to statements made to 
empirical referents, which can be said to be true 
or false. Rather, ‘information’ may also refer to 
meaningful statements that are not ‘fact’ based, 
in the sense of empirical reference. It can refer to 
possible historical events, to statements of fan-
tasy, or to understandable mystical states—all 
dealing with sensible statements of what could be 
(or could have been, in the case of historical 
events) or can be, in the sense of conditionality, 
the case. This will be important to our discussion 
further on. 
Returning to Briet’s Qu’est-ce que la documenta-
tion?, we should note that in this book’s opening 
page the definition of documents as being proof 
or evidence is immediately problematized by her 
as being incomplete, with Briet modifying this def-
inition with the further qualification that a docu-
ment is an indice (an indexical sign). Indeed, this 
qualification removes both documents and evi-
dence from the realm of ‘direct naming’ (where 
the name and the named, like a definition and 
what is defined, appear to remain in the same 
scale of meaning, even if their documentary 
form—for example, the transition from an article 
to its abstract—changes) to a world of pointing 
between different regimes or senses.  
This is a certain type of ‘advance’ upon Otlet’s 
definitional sense of documentary evidence as 
resting on a correspondence of meaning, without 
much regard to sense. In Otlet’s work, a docu-
ment is ‘about’ something and that aboutness is 
repeated through higher and higher levels of ab-
straction without loss of meaning. In Briet’s epis-
temology, however, there is no guarantee for pre-
venting a loss or shift of meaning, as discourses 
about the named entities follow the documental-
ist’s act of naming in “initial” documentation (tax-
onomies and ontologies) and these discourses 
may contain their own grammars or language 
games so that the meaning or reference of the 
entity changes because its sense changes. For 
example, compare the different senses for ‘water’ 
in ecology (e.g., ‘lake’ or ‘stream,’) and chemistry 
(‘e.g., “H20). 
(In philosophy these English terms, “reference” 
and “meaning,” are sometimes used synony-
mously and sometimes not; it depends on 
whether we view meaning starting from the per-
spective of empirical reference or from the per-
spective of sense. From the first perspective, the 
meaning of a term is its reference, but from the 
second perspective, the meaning of a term is a 
product of its sense, which then gives it refer-
ence, though this reference may involve other 
than empirical referents—e.g., fantastic refer-
ences, such as to unicorns and such.) 
From the type of what we’ll call ‘logical positivism’ 
of Otlet’s epistemology, sense is only possible in 
truth conditions, which Otlet sees as grounded in 
scientific statements, ambiguously understood as 
both being contained in and acting as ‘docu-
ments’ of the world. Documents are then either 
sensible or not. Briet’s notion of documents, how-
ever, shifts the grounds of evidence to that of ev-
 
Day, Ronald E. All that is the case: documents and Indexicality. // Scire. 22:1 (en.-jun. 2016) 57-63. ISSN 1135-3716. 
59 
idence’s own definition by social processes of on-
tology creation and discursive formation. Docu-
ments are evidentiary only because of cultural 
and social systems of naming and discourses. 
And so, things (such as antelopes) can be docu-
ments, because they are treated not only as 
signs, but as a very specific sort of sign, one that 
goes beyond ‘signs’ as naming functions alone, 
namely, indices. Documents are no longer about 
things, but are things that are ‘about.’ The manner 
in which things come to be ‘about,’ or evidence, 
is the process of the creation of meaning, and 
though Briet doesn’t go very far in investigating 
this, these are the possibilities and limits of sense 
that cultural and social systems attribute to signs 
as meaningful or ‘semiotic’ signs. 
Understanding signs as indices, rather than as di-
rect or essential representations, is an important 
step in helping us understand documents as not 
being about facts, but being about the possibility 
of facts, even in their absence. It is a step that 
begins to remove us from what Derrida called a 
‘philosophy of presence’ and from a trust in ‘infor-
mation’ as being a signifier of truth conditions, ra-
ther than possibilities for knowledge, belief, and 
trust. It is a step toward a greater accountability 
of ‘facticity’ (the status of being a fact) and what I 
call ‘evidentarity’ (the status of being evidence) 
than is possible if one keeps the notion of docu-
ments and documentation restricted to a naïve 
empiricist or positivist account of signs and texts 
in ‘science.’ Which is to say that it also frees ‘sci-
ence’ from an account of facts and evidence that 
itself is inscribed in a historical metaphysics of 
‘documentarity,’ where ‘the facts’ of beings are 
seen as ‘written’ in their common species-being, 
morphology, DNA, or whatever is the ‘essence’ or 
the substrate that is seen as the essential marker 
of being for a being or for beings. For thinking ev-
identiary signs as sense, and sense as the roots 
of meaning, is an important step in seeing beings 
even in their very absence of being. If we can’t 
account for this, then we have no ability to ac-
count for all ‘non-factual facts,’ namely mystical 
states, ‘fiction,’ and all sort of expressions that are 
sensible, and may even be truthful in some other 
way than a correspondence theory of truth tied to 
an empirical realism.  
This problem of meaning as a correspondence 
theory, reaches back to iconic modes of repre-
sentation and medieval theories of the corre-
spondence of intellect and things (adaequatio in-
tellectus et rei). Along with Wittgenstein’s work, in 
20th century modernity this theory of meaning and 
of truth was challenged by theories of relativity 
and phase states in physics, metonymy and 
grammar in linguistics, and performativity in the 
arts. Broadly we could perhaps summarize these 
as theories of indexicality. Rather than being 
propositional or documentary statements, rather 
than being representational images of things and 
‘states of affairs,’ signs and coherent collections 
of meaningful signs (documents) have metonym-
ical positions within activities in the world. Facts 
are constructed by both meaningful signs and by 
activities with affects and effects. But, this is also 
to write that the domain of ‘facts’ is not limited to 
scientific statements as modes of representation. 
Such a claim is complementary to the claim that 
‘science’ should not be understood as represen-
tational activity, or to put it another way, as a ‘doc-
umentary’ form in the mode that Otlet saw docu-
ments and an epistemology of documentation. 
Rather, science like all other products of experi-
ence and description has its meaningful entities 
because they are products of sensible activities. 
To understand all this better, within the context of 
a document that can only be understood as an 
index, and not as a ‘fact’ (in the mode of repre-
senting only what is as present), let me appeal to 
a photograph taken shortly before the death of 
Professor Eduardo Ismael Murguia Marañon by 
Professor Iuri Rizzi. Photographs are often taken 
as iconic representations of only what is present, 
so appealing to a photograph as an index of what 
is not present is to push both a traditional episte-
mology of photography and also Otlet’s docu-
mentary epistemology (based on the model of 
photography as direct representation, as shown 
in Otlet’s Traité de documentation (Otlet, 1934)) 
to their opposing limits. 
This photograph appeared in the social network-
ing site of Facebook a few days before Eduardo 
Murguia’s death. It is a photograph of the book-
case in his apartment, with an empty chair in front 
of it. A chair that is positioned as if for a portrait, 
in the bourgeois, academic tradition of learned 
men being photographed in front of their personal 
libraries. The bookcase looks like what I saw 
when I visited Eduardo ten months earlier with my 
friend and his colleague, Professor Marcia H.T. 
de Figueiredo Lima, when Marcia took a photo-
graph of Eduardo and me (Figure 2). 
When Rizzi first posted his photograph on Edu-
ardo’s Facebook page, I took it as a sign of Edu-
ardo’s death, but then reading on, I found that the 
photographer had been visiting Eduardo when he 
took this photograph. Perhaps I could be forgiven 
my initial assumption given my understanding 
that Eduardo was suffering from a several year 
battle with kidney cancer, and given the contrast 
with the earlier photograph of the two of us, in 
which he stood where in the later photograph is 
an empty chair. 
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Figure 1 (Reproduced with the permission of the photographer, Professor Iuri Rizzi) 
  
Figure 2 (With permission of the photographer, 
Professor Marcia H.T. de Figueiredo Lima) 
Once I learned that Eduardo was still quite pre-
sent in this life, then I must admit that the index of 
that empty chair turned to myself, and to the 
thought that just as Eduardo may soon be absent 
from the earlier photograph, so too I will be one 
day, and so, too, this photograph will rapidly dis-
appear in human history. The transition from the 
earlier to the later photograph suggests to those 
who are aware of the context, the passing of a 
life. But Rizzi’s photograph in itself suggests both 
the passage and the passing of a life, precisely 
because the owner of the apartment and the 
books, the person who should be sitting in the 
chair for his portrait, is absent. 
There are all sorts of questions of evidence that 
Rizzi’s photograph suggests. What does it index 
and how? How is it that Eduardo was both absent 
from the photograph of what is posed as his por-
trait, while he remained still alive? How do both 
his presence and his absence appear in the pho-
tograph, despite the fact that he is not present 
and yet he is also not absent from it (whether one 
knows that he was alive or not at the time)? How 
does this photograph suggest not a presence of 
a person per se (since that person is absent from 
the photograph), but a potential physical ab-
sence? And how does the photograph perform 
both a future anterior tense (“x will have been”) 
and what is called in English the “going-to future” 
tense, where what is present is carried into the 
future (“This event is going to happen”)? 
If documents (not the least, photographic docu-
ments) are merely evidence of what is, and what 
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is, in the photograph, must be the portrait of Edu-
ardo in order for the photograph to be about Ed-
uardo, then Rizzi’s photograph could not have 
any meaning (at least in regard to being about 
Eduardo) for Eduardo is absent from the photo-
graph. From a viewpoint of strict representation, 
we would have to say that Franco’s photograph 
was ‘mystical,’ and as the early Wittgenstein had 
it, we would have to pass over it in silence. But 
Rizzi’s photograph does quite the opposite, for it 
invokes an entire life, especially for those who 
knew Eduardo and were present with his books 
and bookcases.  
It isn’t just an issue of ‘reception theory,’ but ra-
ther, the photograph speaks of a shared life, 
which involves many people not in the photo-
graph. This life extends beyond the one who is, 
at the center of attention, and not the least by his 
absence. In this regard, I might also point to the 
further uses of Rizzi’s photograph on Eduardo’s 
Facebook site after his death, where Rizzi’s photo 
is covered by a rainbow or ‘Gay’ rainbow flag, in 
celebration of Gay (i.e., homosexual) rights (a 
mechanism of digital superimposition that Face-
book provided in celebration of the United States 
Supreme Court decision on the legality of homo-
sexual marriages in that country in 2015, a few 
weeks after Eduardo’s death). And I could point 
to further postings done on Eduardo’s site many 
months after his death, either automatically per-
formed through Facebook’s algorithms which al-
low a user to have posted on his or her page any 
mention of him by his or her Facebook ‘friends’ or 
through Facebook ‘friends’ who may not have 
been aware of his death. Indeed, Facebook 
pages suggest that at least the documentary life 
of the deceased does not end after his or her 
death.  
We could say that documentation leads to lives 
beyond physical death, but it is perhaps better to 
suggest that what we call ‘my’ life precedes and 
extends beyond the physical ‘me,’ and is literally, 
‘our life,’ in so far as we live as cultural and social 
beings, and particularly in modernity, as often 
mediated by documentary technologies that con-
stitute ‘our life’ in temporal and spatial manners 
that exceed our physical being. In this way, liter-
ary we are, and only together as ‘we’ are we, what 
Suzanne Briet called in Qu’est-ce que la docu-
mentation? “homo documentator.”  
But who and what is this “homo documentator” 
about? In modernity documents are thought of as 
materials that ‘fix’ or ‘store’ information as their 
contents. This fixing and storing is thought to be 
an act of permanent recording. But what we see 
in Franco’s photograph is not the fixing and stor-
ing or even the permanence of what is, but rather 
the indexing of what is not shown by what is 
shown. Namely, what the photograph shows is an 
aspect of Eduardo’s life, and so what the photo-
graph is about is not only Eduardo, but also a 
shared documentary community to which his life 
then, and still in some ways, belongs. This docu-
mentary community, this life, is what is shown. In-
deed, to return to the early Wittgenstein, it is 
shown in its very absence of being ‘said,’ or at 
least without being said with Eduardo himself as 
the center of, literally, its pictorial and strict refer-
ential focus. Or in other words, it is the ‘grammat-
ical sense,’ ‘the way of life,’ of the signs both 
‘within’ and beyond the photographic document 
that give the photograph its meaning or refer-
ence. 
This sense has a lot to do with the ‘social life’ of 
the photograph, as well as the social life of books 
and the social life of the books shown in the pho-
tograph, which inscribe and express communities 
which both composed and shared Eduardo’s life 
in certain of its important aspects. Far from signi-
fying a representational ‘homo documentator,’ 
the photograph on Facebook harkens back to a 
pre-modern function, namely as a token of com-
munal memory, in the way that the Andean quipu 
(or khipu), which were means of record keeping 
through grass branches and knots, formed mem-
ories, largely numeric, but perhaps historical as 
well (Mignolo, 2003). Records, here, didn’t ‘fix’ 
meaning in a representational content, but rather 
evoked meaning by their indexical relay between 
signifying and socio-cultural orders in specific sit-
uations. Likewise, Franco’s photograph is evoca-
tive for a community. Its evocation is that of the 
life of a community in which a specific person, a 
specific time or set of ‘present’ times, are centrally 
involved, not because they are necessarily 
shown, but because, like all meaningful signs, 
they are implicated in the cultural signs of the 
photograph and their social circulation simultane-
ously.  
 
Figure 3. A quipu from the Larco Museum Collection; 
cited in Wikipedia (“quipu”); copyright, Creative 
Commons BY-SA 3.0 
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The indexicality of a document doesn’t just be-
long to or lie in the content or signs of a docu-
ment. But rather, it inhabits the role of documents 
in lives, which give life to one’s self and to others 
even when they are absent. This is sometimes re-
ferred to in English as ‘the life of the mind,’ but it 
isn’t just one mind that is at issue here, but a so-
cial life of cultural forms and social norms in the 
deployment of signs, and so, of the inscription of 
lives and a ‘life.’ It isn’t just that written texts (how-
ever one wants to understand this term) have the 
power to transmit meaning beyond death (do they 
have any ability to ‘transmit’ anything?), but rather 
that they act as fulcrums for the leveraging of 
powers beyond the ‘presence’ that any single one 
believes and acts as they are, because they are 
communal. Or to put it another way, they act for 
all that is not the case, in so far as they remain 
poised to overcome the present in the fulcrum of 
past and present into the future. This is why the 
photograph can be about Eduardo, even then or 
now in his absence in the photograph or physi-
cally on this earth. ‘Our lives’ precede and follow 
‘me’ thanks to meaningful cultural forms (e.g., 
‘language’) in social norms of deployment and 
thanks to the technical and technological medi-
ums of such. These mediums shape our lives, not 
only when I am alive, but following ‘me.’  
A fulcrum, like the chair in Iuri Franco’s photo-
graph, is sometimes made of wood. It can store 
power, both by the flexibility of its own material 
and by serving as a harbor for a resting body. A 
chair only has meaning as a tool of form and func-
tion (or that’s how ‘aboutness’ is determined by 
the Art and Architecture Thesaurus, which treats 
it as a type of furniture, just as any particular work 
of literature is sometimes treated by catalogers as 
a type of genre form and function—‘fiction,’ or a 
‘novel’ for instance). The chair sits empty, just as 
the books sit on the shelves, for purposes of be-
ing used toward some end, and valued as poten-
tials of personal or cultural knowledge. They store 
potential powers in their very structures. These 
potentials are made up of cultural, social, and 
physical (i.e., the body, including the brain) af-
fordances for expression, and so, for identity. 
Franco’s photograph documents not simply any 
objects, but objects belonging to a type of being 
for whom his or her future belongs to the objects 
as much as the objects belong to his or her future. 
The documents on Eduardo’s shelves stood and 
still stand in the photograph, not simply as objects 
that ‘contain’ other minds, but rather as indexes 
of powers of mind, toward conditions of mind, 
conditions of expressions. “Mind” is an individual 
term of personal expression and potential expres-
sions only because it is part of common cultural 
forms and social norms. “Mind” as a personal 
term lies in these commonalities of expression, 
and so can only be said to exist as a part of a 
‘communal mind.’ Conditions of mind are not ran-
dom, but rather, they are part of series of expres-
sions that could exist as meanings in the world 
because there are the affordances of life and ex-
pression that allow them to exist. That is, they 
could exist because they can. The factuality of 
documents must adhere to something believed to 
be possible. This possibility is the source of truth 
conditions, of which the ‘empirical,’ including em-
pirical referents, are only one function. 
So, the answer as to how Eduardo could be both 
present and absent in Franco’s photograph is 
this: because what it shows is a human life, and 
specifically the human life that was Eduardo’s. A 
human life is known by the powers of that being 
which is known as a human being. This is a being 
which doesn’t just ‘use’ documents, much less 
use them for what they ‘contain,’ but rather, which 
sets up a sense of a life by means of documents 
and their signs, including their availability on 
shelves, in databases, etc. And this is what a li-
brary is: a storehouse of affordances for activat-
ing a life within domains of ways of life, and a per-
sonal library is the means toward a very specific 
life.  
These lives are not just expressive, but connec-
tive, because each life is part of larger, literally, 
senses of life. And so, each life has many lives 
within it, not simply because it has many sources 
of potential powers from its own experience, but 
because it continually draws from the ‘external’ 
resources that gave it these experiences. And for 
this reason, as well, a life can continue to live on 
through the document of the photograph, even af-
ter the possessor of the library passes on, and 
even after the library is disassembled and the 
apartment sold and someone else moves in. Or 
even when he or she is absent from the photo-
graph. For the photograph doesn’t contain a per-
son or anything else, but rather, it is a material in 
ways of life for us, and so it is a document be-
cause of what is read, said, and in general, acted 
through it. Photographs first of all index ways of 
life within which they are ‘content.’ 
The portrait of a life remains in the absence of the 
body by means of the promise of the body, and 
this body, most particularly with human beings 
perhaps, gains its sense through social and cul-
tural norms and forms for expressions, upon 
which it hangs. The indice of the photograph are 
made up of the meaningful strands of a life. 
These strands assure a virtual, social and cul-
tural, ‘going to be,’ and they assert a ‘will have 
been.’ Why? Because this is what a human being 
is, for other human beings, and most of all for his 
or her self. A person documents him or herself in 
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this intending and having been. A photograph is 
performed for the present, but it represents un-
foreseeable futures that immediately view it as a 
past once the photograph is taken. To have a 
photograph without one’s self where one’s self is 
expected to be present is to have a past that may 
suggest an absent future, but that future cannot 
be absent.  
Thus, knowledge in Franco’s photograph cannot 
be restricted to ‘scientific’ or ‘empirical’ 
knowledge of the photograph’s content, but rather 
covers these as well as other forms of ‘what is the 
case’ in relation to the content. We are informed 
not by the supposed content of the photograph, 
but by our relations to what we suppose is the 
content, and knowledge settles out in accordance 
with the types of expressions and expectations—
the sense and references—that form these rela-
tions. This ‘accordance’ or “adaequatio” is what a 
documentary life is.  
For better or worse human beings act within a 
vastly expanded world of senses beyond empiri-
cal referents, and these empirical referents are in-
deed only possible as knowledge because of 
these senses. This is the human Umwelt that I 
read through Franco’s photograph. This is the 
event of the document, thanks to those who can 
read these words and can understand this docu-
ment. This is the event of the documents that 
made up Eduardo’s library, as they were and will 
be. And so this is also the absence that I antici-
pate of my own body, that both was, and virtually 
could and can still be found in Eduardo’s library, 
thanks to documentary mediums. Such events 
are present and central to the human Umwelt.  
Eventually your body will betray you, and all you 
will be known by is (your) affects. This is “all that 
is the case,” and this is what these photographs 
show. This is the mystery which, fundamentally 
and ultimately, any document presents to us. This 
is its ethical purpose and its aesthetic form. 
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